From: Thomas Klute Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2015 14:48:45 +0100 Subject: TLS Client auth: Check server verify mode if unset for dir The authentication hook (mgs_hook_authz) failed to consider the server's client verify mode, even if the verify mode was unset in the directory configuration. As a result, invalid certificates were ignored and clients could connect and receive data as long as they presented any certificate whatsoever. Logs showed that authorization was granted despite the certificate being invalid (timestamps removed for readability): [:debug] [pid 10806:tid 140242057148160] gnutls_hooks.c(1198): [client ::1:40992] GnuTLS: Verifying list of 1 certificate(s) via method 'cartel' [:info] [pid 10806:tid 140242057148160] [client ::1:40992] GnuTLS: Could not find Signer for Peer Certificate [:info] [pid 10806:tid 140242057148160] [client ::1:40992] GnuTLS: Peer Certificate is invalid. [authz_core:debug] [pid 10806:tid 140242057148160] mod_authz_core.c(835): [client ::1:40992] AH01628: authorization result: granted (no directives) This commit adds a check for undefined verify mode in the directory configuration and applies the server wide configuration in that case. --- src/gnutls_hooks.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/gnutls_hooks.c b/src/gnutls_hooks.c index 1c2e094..e6e7a67 100644 --- a/src/gnutls_hooks.c +++ b/src/gnutls_hooks.c @@ -871,9 +871,12 @@ int mgs_hook_authz(request_rec * r) { return DECLINED; } rv = mgs_cert_verify(r, ctxt); - if (rv != DECLINED && - (rv != HTTP_FORBIDDEN || - dc->client_verify_mode == GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE)) { + if (rv != DECLINED + && (rv != HTTP_FORBIDDEN + || dc->client_verify_mode == GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE + || (dc->client_verify_mode == -1 + && ctxt->sc->client_verify_mode == GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE))) + { return rv; } }